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Contentious Matters and the Advisory Power:

The ICJ and Israel's Wall
Joel S. Tashjian*
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), the judicial arm of the United
Nations, recently issued an advisory opinion concerning the legal consequences
of Israel's construction of a wall separating it from the Occupied Palestinian
Territory.' Although issued under the auspices of advisory power, this case
concerned the interests of two entities: the state-like Palestinian Authority and
the state of Israel. The subject matter was contentious, with the entities engaged
in a politically charged border dispute. In a traditional contentious matter, the
ICJ may only adjudicate cases between consenting states. However, a truly
contentious proceeding was not possible in this case. Palestine was and remains
incapable of consenting to contentious jurisdiction because it is not a member of
the UN, and Israel has steadfastly refused to offer its consent.
In choosing to resolve the legal questions submitted by the General
Assembly, the ICJ has created two distinct problems. First, the legal
ramifications of issuing an advisory opinion in a contentious matter establish
opportunities for future entities, through the use of the General Assembly, to
achieve favorable judgments exparte. Second, because Palestine may not actually
appear in a contentious proceeding, the Court's opinion here can only be
understood as a political statement. Each problem raises issues of the relevancy
and the continued vitality of the Court, and each may give significant pause to
those states who continue to consent to the ICJ's jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE ISRAELI WALL OPINION
Palestine and the General Assembly sought this advisory opinion following
a failed Palestinian attempt to achieve a resolution from the Security Council.
The draft of the October 2003 resolution would have "condemned as illegal the
-
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construction by Israel of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory departing
from the Armistice Line of 1949. ' ,2 Instead, by virtue of its "special status of
observer," granted by the General Assembly, Palestine had more success in cosponsoring a resolution requesting the ICJ to issue an advisory opinion on the
matter.
Unlike Article III courts in the United States, the ICJ has competence and
jurisdiction to render advisory opinions on "legal questions" submitted by any
authorized body. By statute, such bodies include the General Assembly, the
Security Council, and other organizations the General Assembly so chooses. a
Parties appearing before the Court in advisory cases need not be Members of
the UN nor even states at all. The practice of issuing advisory opinions began in
the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"), predecessor to the ICJ
and created along with the League of Nations. After some debate, UN founders
granted advisory power to the ICJ under essentially the same terms as that of
PCIJ.5
II. THE LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. CONTENTIOUS NATURE OF ENTITIES INVOLVED
In the procedural sense, the Court was certainly correct that this was not a
contentious case. In fact, the same issue could not have been presented in a
contentious case before the Court for two reasons. First, Palestine is not a
member of the United Nations, a qualifier necessary to appear as a party in a
contentious case before the ICJ. Second, Israel has steadfastly asserted it would
not submit to jurisdiction before the Court for issues related to the occupation
of Palestine.6
Beyond these technical distinctions, however, the case bore many
similarities to a contentious matter. Although many parties presented before the
Court, this matter involved essentially two entities, engaged in a border dispute.7
2

Id at

20.

3

Id at
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Kenneth Lawing Penegar, Relationship of Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice to the
Maintenance of World Minimum Order, 113 U Pa L Rev 529, 534 (1965); Statute of the International
Cburt of Justice, 59 Stat 1055, TS No 933, art 65 at 1, available online at <www.icj-cij.org>
(visited Mar 14, 2005).

5

Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the InternationalCourt, 1920-1996, 286 (Martinus Nijhoff
3d ed 1997).
Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 Harv Intl L J 65,

6

131 (2003).
7

Advisory Opinion, Construction ofa Wall in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory, 2004 ICJ at
note 1).

12 (cited in

VoL 6 No. 1

Contentious Matters and the Advisory Power: the ICJ and Israel's Wall

Tasjian

Border disputes in particular are a common source of contentious cases before
international courts.' Against this backdrop, the ICJ decided a matter which
looks thoroughly like a contentious case under the auspices of advisory power.
By rejecting American and Israeli challenges over the undeveloped fact
pattern, the Court implicitly reasoned that this case was not abstract, but rather
quite specific. 9 Indeed, the case involved two adverse parties at a specific
moment over specific behavior, namely the building of a wall claimed by one to
be illegal. The US argued in its brief that the Court was adjudicating precisely a
contentious matter, claiming," . . . it would be incompatible with the purpose of
the advisory opinion procedure for it to be used for dispute-resolution between
non-consenting parties, or in a way that effectively determines the substantive
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See, for example, Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to PublicInternationalLaw
315 (Macmillan 4th ed 1981). For a general discussion of recent ICJ cases, see Colter Paulson,
Compliance with FinalJudgments of the International Court of Justice Since 1987, 98 Am J Intl L 434
(2004).
See Advisory Opinion, Construcion of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Teritogy, 2004 ICJ at
57
(cited in note 1).
The traditional arguments against advisory opinion authority often focus upon the lack of
contention between those petitioning the court. As a consequence, courts in advisory posture
would lack the necessary fact development to render a meaningful opinion. Felix Frankfurter
argued that ".... advisory opinions are bound to move in an unreal atmosphere" and that they are
"rendered upon sterilized and mutilated issues." Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Adtisogy Opinions, 37
Harv L Rev 1002, 1006 (1923-1924). To Frankfurter, the best means of ensuring adequate factual
development was to require two adverse parties in a contest. The US Supreme Court has itself
refused advisory power, adhering to the practice of "never . . . anticipat[ing] a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it" and "never... forumlat[ing] a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." Lea
Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Article III: Perspectiveson the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 Harv L
Rev 297, 302-03 (1979), quoting Liverpool, NY & PhiladehiaSS Co v Commrs of Emigration,113 US
33, 39 (1885).
In the ICJ opinion, both the United States and Israel proffered arguments similar to those of
Frankfurter. Indeed, for both Israel and the US, these were the only issues briefed for the Court.
Neither the US nor Israel chose to address the merits in their briefs to the Court. See Advisory
Opinion, Construction ofa Wall in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory 2004 ICJ at
55, 57 (cited in note
1); Sean D. Murphy, ICJ Advisory Opinion on Israel" Security Fence in Sean D. Murphy, ed,
Contemporagy Practice of the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 98 Am J Intl L 361, 363 (2004).
Since Israel declined to present an argument before the court and did not reach the merits in its
brief, it was effectively absent from the case. The US argued such absence prevented the Court
from adequately developing the fact record, and may otherwise deprive the Court of "necessary
information." Id. Israel asserted that without its participation, the factual basis for the Court's
decision would be incomplete. Advisory Opinion, Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Teritory 2004 ICJ at 55 (cited in note 1). The Court was not persuaded, however, asserting that
such objections only apply to contentious cases.

Summer 2005

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

outcome of a particular legal dispute between parties."' By asserting its
authority to sufficiently establish the facts, the Court transformed the
controversy from abstract to discrete.
Palestine appeared before the Court in a fashion akin to that of an adverse
litigant. The General Assembly has granted Palestine "special status of observer"
since 1977, and it was co-sponsor of the resolution submitting the question for
advisory opinion." As such, the ICJ permitted Palestine to submit a written
statement (brief)12 and present six representatives for oral argument, the most of
any participant.
The Court strongly dismissed suggestions that this case was really
contentious. Beyond the procedural posture, the Court argued that the security
of Palestine and Israel's construction of the wall were matters of concern for the
entire UN.' 3 Citing a "permanent responsibility" to Palestine by virtue of the
institutional framework which permits its "special status of observer," the ICJ
asserted this was an appropriate use of an advisory opinion. 4
Similarly, the Court did not concern itself with the absence of Israel from
the proceeding. Again, because this was an advisory opinion, the Court did not
find it necessary for Israel to participate, despite objections to the contrary."
Critics argued that because this case looked so contentious, the Court's decision
to proceed without the participation of Israel "brushed aside weighty questions
about [the Court's] own jurisdiction.' ' 16 This, coupled with the fact that Palestine
is not a Member of the General Assembly, and could not appear before the
court in a contentious matter, casts potential doubt as to the Court's wisdom in
issuing the decision.'

II

Murphy, 98 Am J Intl L at 363 (cited in note 9) (this was, of course, an alternative argument to
that proffered earlier that the Court could not effectively adjudicate this matter because the fact
pattern remained incomplete by virtue of Israel's conspicuous absence from participating).
Advisory Opinion, Construction of a Wall in the Occupied PalestinianTerritog 2004 ICJ at 1 4 (cited in
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Id at
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B. THE EASTERN CARELIA PRECEDENT AND ADVISORY
POWER IN THE WORLD COURTS
Traditionally, world courts have been reluctant to issue advisory opinions
in cases that otherwise appear contentious. The PCIJ established this important
precedent in the often-cited Eastern Carelia matter. The case involved a dispute
solely between Russia and Finland. Operating under rules of jurisdiction similar
to those of the ICJ, the PCIJ held that because the League of Nations had not
obtained consent to jurisdiction from the USSR, rendering an advisory opinion
would effectively impose jurisdiction upon a non-consenting party.'" The PCIJ
refused to reach the merits, stating "the question put to it was directly related to
the main point of a dispute actually pending between two States, so that
answering the question would be substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute
between the parties.""
Members of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee of 1944 (a formative
body for the UN), debating the scope of ICJ authority, recognized the wisdom
of the Eastern Carelia principle."0 The Committee reasoned that a State should
not be permitted to request advisory opinions, explaining:
[G]iven the authoritative nature of the Court's pronouncements, ex parte
applications would afford a means whereby the State concerned could
indirectly impose a species of compulsory jurisdiction on the rest of the
the Court must have an agreed basis of fact on which to
world. In addition,
2
give its opinion. '
While the precise concern was that of individual states seeking advisory
opinions, the general fear of the Court using advisory power to circumvent
traditional contentious proceedings and render ex parte decisions remains apt.
This is particularly important considering the precedential value of advisory
opinions. Although there is no res judicata effect to an advisory opinion, it
remains an "authoritative statement of the law."22 Hence 23an advisory opinion
carries precedential value comparable to that of a judgment.
In the past, the ICJ had been reluctant to issue any opinion in which an
24
absent party's legal interests form the subject matter of a dispute. Yet the ICJ
18

Von Glahn, Public InternationalLaw at 530 (cited in note 8).
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Penegar, 113 U Pa L Rev at 548 (quotation omitted) (cited in note 4).
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21

Id (quoting Informal Inter-Allied Committee of 1944).
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Rosenne, Law and Practice of the International Court at 310 (cited in note 5); see also Mohamed
Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court 168 (Cambridge 1996).
See, for example, Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-DialogicAbstention by
the InternationalCourt ofJustice, 18 Mich J Ind L 399, 416 (1997).
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may have begun to move away from the Eastern Carelia rule. In the Court's
pivotal advisory opinion, Legaity of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (in which
the court declared Iran's threat to use nuclear weapons to be illegal under any
circumstances), the Court assumed a position of fact finder in a manner that
arguably had not been seen in the advisory context.25 Following this decision, the
Court may choose to play an active role in developing factual records, and issue
advisory opinions in cases lacking affected parties. Indeed, those who advocated
use of the advisory power regarding the Israeli wall issue pointed to the Iran
decision as an authority. 26 Coupling the Iran and the Israeli wall decisions, the
Court seems to have eroded the per se rule against issuing advisory opinions in de
facto contentious matters.
C. THIS OPINION IS UNENFORCEABLE
Despite its willingness to "adjudicate" the legality of Israel's wall, the ICJ
will likely encounter difficulty enforcing this opinion. The Court incorporated
strong language to mandate that "all States are under an obligation not to
recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory . . . [and to] ensure compliance by Israel with
international humanitarian law . ,27 Effective enforcement, however, depends
upon the voluntary compliance of willing states. 2' Despite the strong language
from the Court, only through volitional action will the UN or individual states
implement any of its commands.2 9
This is troublesome because Israel and the US have publicly vowed not to
comply with or recognize the ruling. Israel did not even admit to jurisdiction for
this issue.3 ° Consequently, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was swift to

25

Harvey Rishikof, When Naked Came the Doctrine of "Sef-Defense": What is the Proper Role of the
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InternationalCourt ofJustice in Use of Force Cases?,29 Yale J Intl L 331, 340 (2004).
See Hilaire McCoubrey, Address at the United Nations International Meeting on the Convening of the
Conference on Measures to Enforce the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territoy,
Including
Jerusalem,
available
online
at
<http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/
3b8a2154701b3ffa8525683c0056b022?OpenDocument> (visited Mar 14, 2005); see also Imseis,
44 Harv Int LJ at 131 (cited in note 6).
Advisory Opinion, Construction of a Wall in the Occupied PalestinianTeritogy, 2004 ICJ at 159 (cited

28

in note 1).
Alan Isenberg, A Ruling that Will Undermine InternationalLaw, Fin Times (London) 13 (July 22,

26

29
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2004).
As a legal matter, the court may not bind any party which is not before the court. Indeed the
Court's own statute, at Article 59, expressly prohibits legal obligations derived from an advisory
opinion. Perez, 18 MichJ Intl L at 418 (cited in. note 24).
McCoubrey, Address at the United Nations(cited in note 26).
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denounce the Court's command. 3' Sharon stated unequivocally that he "totally
rejects" the non-binding opinion.3 2 Similarly, the United States indicated it would
not abide by the ruling, maintaining its assertion that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction,
and that the Court "was not the appropriate forum to resolve this conflict."3 3
Consequently, Palestine retains few options for possible enforcement of
the judgment, none of which seem plausible. First, the General Assembly may
adopt the Court's language in a resolution, which it did one week following the
release of the advisory opinion.34 The General Assembly, however, lacks the
authority to do more than call upon Israel to abide by the ruling and remove the
wall. 35 Second, Palestine could press the UN Security Council to impose
sanctions or even military action based upon the ruling.36 Given the strong
opposition to the ruling by the US, and its veto power within the Council, this
option seems highly unlikely to succeed. No doubt the Court was aware of these
shortcomings when it issued the advisory opinion. Yet the decision to proceed
despite questions of its authoritative power reveals underlying uncertainty as to
the long-term relevancy of the Court.
D. THIS OPINION LACKS A LEGAL PURPOSE
The threatened viability of this precedent recalls a general critique of
advisory opinions. The Court should not be permitted to bind the hands of
future courts through premature advisory opinions. Advisory opinions permit
judges to proclaim law by giving precedential value to controversies not present
before the Court.37 This is a feature unique to judicial systems, for legislatures
may always repeal laws they find unworkable in the future.38 In this case, the
precedent upon the merits will likely never come before the Court, for Palestine
and Israel are highly unlikely to appear as parties in a contentious matter. The
general practice sanctioned here, however, of issuing opinions with strong

31
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legislatures may repeal old laws without preconceived thresholds or notions of countervailing
evidence necessary for reversal.
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precedential value, may constrain future courts faced with contentious cases
involving similar issues.39
Ambiguity over whether a similar case is advisory or contentious would
create a myriad of problems for future courts trying to apply its precedent. The
Court would have two options in applying such precedent to a contentious
matter, neither of which is desirable. It would have to determine whether the
case is truly advisory or contentious. Rules opined under advisory power are
generally regarded as binding or heavily persuasive authority in future advisory
4
opinions. Such rules, however, are not binding in traditional contentious cases. 0
If the Court holds that the case is advisory, it may decline to apply its rule in a
future contentious case, rendering the initial ruling meaningless. On the other
hand, if it holds that the opinion was in fact contentious, or otherwise finds it
authoritative, the ICJ will have created an opportunity for States to procure
binding judgments ex parte. Such a rule would expressly contravene the
intentions of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee when it granted the Court
advisory power.
The Court rebuked this challenge in the opinion, asserting that it did not
regard a challenge that its opinion would have no useful purpose to be
dispositive. Instead, the Court asserted it will not decide how its opinion will be
used.4 1 In doing so, however, the Court cannot be understood to claim it is not
concerned about how it will use its own advisory opinion. Nevertheless, because
the ICJ did not specifically address how it would regard its own precedent with
regard to the authority created here, such issue would remain for a future court.42
III. THE POLITICAL OR PRUDENTIAL ARGUMENT
A. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A PROCEDURALLY CONTENTIOUS
CASE CONCERNING ISRAEL'S WALL
However favorable the Court's opinion may have been toward it, Palestine
may not appear before the Court in any contentious matter. Palestine is not a
member of the UN and may not seek redress of actual grievances in the ICJ.

39

While an advisory decision is never binding upon the parties, the precedential authority of the

40

legal conclusions remain accurate statements of international law, and do demand compliance by
the requesting party at minimum. Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court at 168 (cited in note
23).
Brilmayer, 93 Harv L Rev at 309 (cited in note 9).

41
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(cited in note 1).
In this case, of course, it is likely this matter will never present itself before the court again, as
Israel has contended it will not submit to ICJ jurisdiction over the matter.
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Furthermore, Israel has emphatically asserted that it would not consent to
jurisdiction over this matter with Palestine.4 3 Consequently, as a procedural
matter, this case could not come before the Court despite the defacto contentious
nature of the dispute.
While the court certainly had legal authority to accept the case and render
an opinion, a prudential argument militates against issuing this opinion. Through
the procedural mechanism of advisory power, the Court has ultimately issued an
opinion with no legal consequence. Although this jurisdictional solution may
have allowed Palestine to appear before the Court in a dispute it would not
otherwise have standing to bring, it permitted the Court to enter a nonjusticiable debate, issuing an opinion with no legal value.
B. THIS OPINION IS OF POLITICAL VALUE ONLY
The value of the Court's opinion is ultimately political only. By definition,
the advisory opinion is not binding upon the entities. As well, its precedential
value on the merits is nullified by Palestine's inability to bring this matter before
the Court in a contentious case. The Court likely assumed this case as an
opportunity to advance the debate on Israel's construction of the wall."
Nevertheless, the prudence of issuing political pronouncements under the guise
of an advisory opinion remains debatable. While international courts are often
involved in issues that lean closer to political than justiciable, 45 this case
presented purely political issues for the ICJ.
Consequently, in this context the Court more closely resembled a
diplomatic agency instead of a judicial body. 46 As such, the ICJ acts as a lobbying
arm of the General Assembly, whose purpose is to pressure the Security Council
and individual States to act in compliance with its "pronouncements" of
international law. In such a role, the traditional distinctions between the judiciary
and the legislature begin to break down. While certain parties-such as
Palestine, who may not otherwise appear before the Court-may welcome this

43
44

46

Imseis, 44 Harv Intl J at 131 (cited in note 6).
Over time, the Court has trended toward using its advisory power to "stimulate reasoned debate"
and advance the political dialogue on certain issues. As such, the Court may view its opinions as
invitations to the political actors involved to revisit a certain debate, focusing the actors on
international legal principles as announced by the Court. For an example involving sovereignty in
East Timor, see Perez, 18 Mich J Intl L at 423 (cited in note 24).
Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Setiks: (H-a) 1 ruts and Consequences, 38 Tex Intl L J 405, 419 (2003).
Indeed, international judges are often forced into diplomatic roles when faced with politically
charged issues. See id at 418.
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alternative method of courting sympathetic opinions, 47 their adversaries may
begin to question the authority and relevance of the ICJ. Faced with a Court that
injects international law into a politically charged debate in an exparte manner,
many states may question whether the ICJ is able to decide legal questions
without political influence. Accordingly, states may question the wisdom of all
ICJ decisions, re-evaluating their interest in consenting to the Court's
jurisdiction.
C. POSSIBLE COMPLIANCE AND VINDICATION
Perhaps the Court will ultimately be vindicated if substantive policy
changes result. Following the initially unequivocal denouncement of the opinion
by Ariel Sharon, Israel has softened its position on the wall. Indeed, Israeli
Supreme Court President Barak has pressured Israel to address the advisory
opinion on its merits. At a minimum, Barak will not permit the government to
dismiss the opinion as predicated upon bias toward Palestine.48 And, if Israel reexamines it policy toward the wall, or modifies future behavior, the advisory
opinion may well be heralded as a success.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, such aspirations remain hopeful at best. The Court may not
be able to rely on such cooperation in the future. Over the long run, the Court
will likely face a similar contentious matter, brought to it under the auspices of
an advisory opinion, and it will look to this example for guidance. If the Court
begins a practice of issuing advisory opinions in similar matters, the important
rule established in Eastern Carelia will be lost. In addition, the Court will
transform itself into a quasi-political entity, lobbying for a particular course of
action in matters the ICJ itself can not enforce. Once that transition is complete,

47
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Some commentators have argued that ICJ advisory opinions should be used to proclaim and
advance international law in situations where a contentious decision would likely not arise. In
the past, a general lack of willingness by international courts to address political issues because
states would not consent to jurisdiction hindered the development of human rights law.
Although not binding, those who sought to advance certain human rights issues still found
valuable the "legal and moral effects" of advisory opinions. See, for example, Jo M.
Pasqualucci, Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Contributing to the
Evolution of InternationalHuman Rights Law, 38 Stan J Intl L 241, 242, 244, 249 (2002). See also
Deborah L. Houchins, Extending the Application of the ICJ's July 8, 1996, Advisoy Opinion to
Environment-Altering Weapons in General- What is the Role of InternationalEnvironmental Law in
Watfare?, 22 J Land Res & Env L 463, 463, 466 (2002). Houchins advocates the use of advisory
opinions to advance certain global environmental issues where contentious decisions are either
unlikely or perhaps impossible.
Dan Izenberg, Urging the Government to Presentthe Facts,Jerusalem Post 2 (Oct 27, 2004).

Vol. 6 No. 1

ContentiousMatters and the Advisory Power. the ICJ and Israel's Wall

Tasjian

consenting nations-in particular those of the Security Council, for whom the
Court directs this type of action-will re-examine their interest in ICJ
jurisdiction. Should the relevancy of the Court begin to wane, the UN may lose
the benefit of its independent judiciary.
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